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Abstract
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is, at least on paper, enjoying widespread popularity in
determining the level of executive compensation. Yet existing empirical evidence of RPE is decidedly
mixed. Two principal explanations are held responsible for this discord. A constructional challenge
arises from intricacies of identifying the correct peers. And on a simpler note, corporate commitments
to RPE could be mere exercises in empty rhetoric. We address both issues and test the use of RPE
in a new sample of large international non-U.S. banks. Taken as a whole, the banks in our sample
show moderate evidence consistent with RPE. We report stronger evidence once we investigate the
subsample of banks that disclose the use of peers in their compensation schemes. This finding lends
support to the credibility and thus informational value of RPE commitments. Digging deeper, we
conclude that RPE usage is driven by firm size and growth options.
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1 Introduction
The rise in executive compensation in international banking in the last two decades has been striking. By
the end of 2003 Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns, large players in the banking industry at
that time, were run by CEOs whose earnings were among the top ten in the S&P 500 (Hodgson 2004).
Two of these banks - Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns - happened to collapse in 2008, triggering a
global economic panic and unfolding the recent financial crisis. According to Bebchuk et al. (2010), in
spite of obvious mismanagement the executives of these banks had received considerable performance-
based compensation packages during the years preceding the financial crisis. It stands to reason that the
effectiveness of such compensation schemes have since become subject of ever more heated discussions,
not least in international banking. Sure enough, the recent rise in executive compensation has not been
confined to the banking industry. Other industries have been following the same trend. Murphy (2013)
documents that total pay for executives in the S&P 500 exploded in the late 2000s.
This general development has also piqued the interest of economists, who are particularly intrigued
by the underlying pay-setting mechanism. Executive compensation is a classic example of a principal-
agent problem and lies at the heart of the controversy of corporate separation of ownership and control
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Put succinctly, the challenge lies in motivating the CEO (the agent) to act
in the best interest of the shareholder (the principal). Because the effort of the agent is not perfectly
observable, the principal is not able to force the agent to choose the action that would be optimal from
the principal’s perspective. This invokes a moral hazard problem. There has been much discussion how
and in what way firms are to solve this agency problem (Ross 1973, Gjesdal 1982, Mahoney 1995). A
straightforward solution would involve a compensation scheme which provides desirable incentives for
the CEO. Economic intuition would suggest tying compensation to firm performance. However, firm
performance is also influenced by a myriad of factors that are beyond the control of the agent. This
exogeneity introduces undesirable risk into contracting.
This is where relative performance evaluation (RPE) comes in (Holmstrom 1982). RPE implies that
compensation contracts should be linked to firm performance in relation to peers with similar charac-
teristics. Such contracts account for common shocks that are out of the agent’s control and thus offer a
more conclusive way to assess the agent’s individual performance. Moreover, RPE contracts offer the
same incentives as contracts based on absolute performance. The case for employing RPE in executive
compensation contracts seems clear-cut. Indeed, RPE has become seemingly popular in practice. For
example, recent studies suggest that roughly every fourth firm in the S&P 1500 openly claims to use RPE
in their compensation contracts (Carter et al. 2009, Gong et al. 2011).
In this paper, we test the existence of RPE in international banking and pay particular attention to
banks who seem to purport its application. RPE has been extensively investigated empirically. Most
studies try to infer its usage by regressing executive compensation on the performance of a target firm
and some measure of peer group performance. A negative and statistically significant coefficient on peer
performance is taken as indication that common shocks are being removed from compensation contracts,
constituting evidence of RPE. The scope of the existing studies is rather limited, however. They focus
attention on compensation practices of industrial firms, and most of the studies make exclusively use of
U.S. data.1 This regional limitation comes as no real surprise. It is difficult to obtain comprehensive data
on executive compensation outside of the U.S.
Despite the ubiquitously proclaimed use of RPE in practice, the empirical results of these studies
have been a mixed bag.2 This is partly owed to the fact that the post hoc construction of the peer groups
1Antle and Smith (1986) examine RPE in a sample of chemical, aerospace, and electronics firms. Rajgopal et al. (2006)
cover a wide range of industries with the three largest groups being Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services, Chemicals and
Allied Products, and Depository Institutions. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) exploit
ExecuComp data, restricting them to U.S. firms. Joh (1999) tests RPE on a sample of Japanese firms in the manufacturing
sector.
2For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Albuquerque (2009), and Black et al. (2015) find empirical support for the
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is rarely open to scrutiny. If the econometrician identifies a different peer group than the target firm itself
had actually used, inferences on RPE are no longer meaningful. Yet peer group identification is only one
reason why one may fail to find evidence of RPE. A simpler explanation would be that the RPE claims
are merely empty rhetoric to appease proponents of good corporate practice. As Albuquerque (2009)
puts it, any empirical tests of RPE are, in this sense, joint tests.
This paper embraces this duality and tests for RPE in a new sample of large and globally operating
non-U.S. banks.3 We contend that the global banking industry is an ideal playground to test the usage of
RPE, for at least three reasons. First, RPE makes especially sense for firms that are exposed to common
shocks. This applies particularly well to international banking. The main reason for this exposure is that
banks are highly leveraged institutions. Around 90 percent of their assets come from debt, making them
more prone to exogenous volatility (Houston and James 1995, Chen et al. 2006). Second, the barriers
to global integration in the banking industry have been significantly trimmed in the last two decades,
shifting banks from once highly centralized domestic organizations to global behemoths. In turn, the
structure of competition in the industry has adjusted (Berger and Smith 2003). Large banks operating on
the international level are now dealing with intense competition.4 Third, the recent financial crisis was
characterized by failures of large international banks such as Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, or Lehman
Brothers. The downfall of these banks has drawn increasing attention to corporate governance issues in
remuneration policy.5 If anything, this pressure has prompted banks to make more efficient use of RPE.
Our study tackles the caveat that the soundness of empirical tests on RPE critically hinges on the
correct identification of the peer groups. We follow the sophisticated approach by Albuquerque (2009)
and aggregate peer performance on the basis of industry and industry/size peer groups. Aggregating in
this manner accounts for the observation that industry affiliation and firm size are informative proxies for
the common market risks that RPE-setting firms face. This approach, then, takes up Holmstrom’s (1979)
theoretical requirement of common uncertainties. Our study also deals with the potential issue of RPE
being corporate cheap talk. If that were the case then signaling the disclosure of peer group usage would
be mere noise, and incorporating this information should not alter our results qualitatively. To test this
hypothesis, we differentiate between disclosing and non-disclosing banks.
We collect a new data set with information of 42 large international banks. The results of our ba-
sic regression specification document negative and insignificant parameter estimates in industry peers.
Taken by itself, this casts doubt on the use of RPE in our sample. However, when we perform tests of
RPE on more nuanced industry/size peers, we find moderate evidence consistent with RPE. When further
restricting attention to the subsample of disclosing banks, we find stronger and more conclusive evidence
that systematic risk is filtered out from CEO compensation. Strong-form RPE tests support this conclu-
sion. This finding stands in contrast to Gong et al. (2011), who do not find informational value in RPE
disclosure among U.S. firms.6 To gain more insight, we disentangle the main drivers of RPE. A logistic
regression indicates that firm size and growth options play a major role in determining the likelihood of
RPE usage. The results imply that the greater a bank is, the higher is the probability that it will use RPE
RPE hypothesis. In contrast, Janakiraman et al. (1992), Antle and Smith (1986), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b), Jensen and
Murphy (1990), and Antle and Smith (1986) fail to provide evidence for RPE or present mixed results.
3U.S. banks were excluded in our analysis because of a regulatory event during the observed timeframe (see Section 3.1
for details). To our knowledge, there are only two studies that test RPE on U.S. banks, Barro and Barro (1990) and Crawford
(1999). We elaborate on them in Section 2.2.
4Bikker and Haaf (2002) investigate the competitive conditions and concentration in banking markets of 23 industrialized
countries inside and outside Europe over 10 years. They form three sub-markets in terms of bank sizes for each country and
estimate the corresponding competition conditions. They show that large banks operate mostly in international markets and
are exposed to strong competition. On the other hand, smaller banks operate mainly in local markets and are facing less
competition.
5Bebchuk et al. (2010) find that the pay structures in Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers had provided top executives with
overbearing risk-taking incentives. This misalignment let them focus on a company’s short-term performance while paying too
little attention to the long term value of the company.
6Our classification of RPE statements is less strict than Gong et al. (2011) so our estimates on its informational value are,
if anything, to be interpreted conservatively. See Section 3.1 for more details.
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in its compensation contracts. On the other hand, the probability of using RPE is decreasing with the
magnitude of growth options.
Our paper contributes to the ongoing discussion on RPE along several dimensions. Existing studies
testing RPE on banks have focused solely on U.S. data. This is hard to square with an industry that
is characterized by pronounced international competition. We provide broader evidence by conducting
tests on a newly collected sample of large international banks from 2004 to 2013. In addition, we
determine the main drivers of RPE in this industry. Both tasks rely on a sound and accountable peer
group construction mechanism, adding to the conclusiveness of our findings. We also shed new light on
the informative value of disclosure over time. Our results suggest that the banks in our sample which
proclaim the use of peers in assessing the performance of their CEOs are not merely window dressing:
We do find stronger evidence for RPE usage among disclosing banks. For our sample, this would imply
that lumping together disclosing and non-disclosing firms can be detrimental to the conclusiveness of
RPE tests.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical background of RPE
and describes the main characteristics of the banking industry. The section also introduces the empirical
model and depicts the peer group construction mechanism. Section 3 presents our novel dataset of
international banks. Section 4 reports summary statistics and regression results. In Section 5, we identify
the main drivers of RPE in our sample. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relative performance evaluation and the banking industry
2.1 Relative performance evaluation
This section summarizes the theoretical foundation of relative performance evaluation (RPE). In a first
step, we outline the principal-agent framework that underlies the relation between an executive’s com-
pensation and the performance of the firms he or she manages. We then briefly discuss the seminal
theoretical works of Holmstrom (1979, 1982) as well as the essay of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) on
contracting, which has had useful applications in the RPE literature.
Holmstrom (1979) analyzed the principal-agent problem in a theoretical framework. In his setting
only the noisy outcome of an agent’s action is observable, so optimal contracts are bound to be second-
best because of moral hazard. To ameliorate the effect of negative incentives, a principal can use other
available information about the agent’s action or other agents’ state of nature. Holmstrom (1982) refines
his earlier results and shows that an ”agent’s sharing rules can, without loss in welfare, be written on
a statistic of all observations if and only if this statistic is sufficient in the sense of statistical decision
theory.” (p.325). One application can be found in the use of relative performance evaluation in incentive
contracts. Holmstrom concludes that ”relative performance evaluation will be valuable if one agent’s
output provides information about another agent’s state uncertainty. Such will be the case if and only if
agents face some common uncertainties.” (p.325). He goes on to show that compensation schemes that
compare the agent’s performance with aggregate measures such as peer averages are more efficient since
they provide more information on common uncertainties.
Following Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom (1982), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), and Gibbons
and Murphy (1990), we now present a simple model of relative performance evaluation. Assume that y
denotes a measurable output, a represents the agent’s effort, and  is observational noise with zero mean.
Let output be directly linked to effort as follows:
y = a +  (1)
If output is the only observable variable, the principal will make the agent’s wage contingent on it, so
w(y). The principal then observes outcome y, pays wage w(y) to the agent, and keeps y−w(y) for himself.
3
Holmstrom (1979) assumes that the agent receives the wage contingent on one additional variable, z. This
makes the agent’s wage a function of two variables, so we denote the wage with w(y, z). The variable z is
a noisy but informative signal. It provides additional information for evaluating the agent’s unobservable
effort. In practice this signal can be a market index or the output of some other agents. As stressed
by Gibbons and Murphy (1990), the inclusion of z provides greater incentives without increasing risk
exposure.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) assume that y and z are jointly normally distributed. Furthermore,
they assume that the expected value of the new information is zero (E[z] = 0), the variance of the new
signal is Var[z] = σ2z , the variance of the output is Var[y] = σ
2
y , and that the correlation of z and y is
Cor[z, y] = ρ. The covariance between the output and the informative signal is therefore Cov[z, y] =
ρσz σy. Finally,  denotes an error term. In this model, the optimal sharing rule is linear in y and z:
s(y, z) = α1 · y + α2 · z +  (2)
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) calculate the regression coefficients as well as the action and profit level
and observe that the additional signal z is equivalent to a reduction in the variance of y. Equation (2)
represents a simple model of relative performance evaluation, a model that has been widely used in em-
pirical papers to test the presence of RPE. Holmstrom (1982) suggests that the necessary information
regarding the common uncertainty can be captured by an aggregate measure such as the weighted av-
erage of peer performance. In this sense, RPE is an application of the informativeness principle: Tying
the income of an agent relative to their peer group filters out exogenous sources of randomness from the
agent’s compensation. The main advantage of RPE is that it provides the same incentives as compen-
sation based on absolute performance while isolating the agent from exogenous sources of randomness
that influence the observed performance.
2.2 Banking industry
This section summarizes the economic particularities of banks and discusses current executive compen-
sation practices in the banking industry. Banks are institutions that differ from other businesses in many
aspects. To gain more insight into the practices of executive compensation in this industry, it is instructive
to understand the particularities of banks, especially their governance structures.
The literature stresses three characteristic features of banks (John and Qian 2003, Macey and O’Hara
2003, Tung 2011). First, banks have a peculiar capital structure. They hold much less equity than other
companies, rendering them highly leveraged. Roughly 90 percent of the funds in banks comes from debt.
Moreover, a bank’s assets and liabilities are mismatched.7 This makes them vulnerable to bank runs if
all the customers’ deposits were to be called at once (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Second, federal
guarantees of bank deposits are a public measure to protect private depositors from losses in case of
insolvency. These guarantees make both managers and shareholders more likely to pursue risk-taking
investment strategies. Deposit insurance disincentivizes depositors from monitoring the actions taken by
the managers or shareholders of the bank. This leaves wiggle room for risky investment strategies by
bank managers. Third, Macey and O’Hara (2003) point out that deposit insurance can increase the risk of
fraud and self dealing in the banking industry because it reduces the incentives for monitoring. Ironically
enough, the reduced monitoring triggered by the deposit insurance can increase the risk of bank runs, the
very risk that the insurance is meant to address. 8
7The assets of a bank are in form of loans that have mid- to long-term maturity while its liabilities are mostly in form of
deposits that must be repaid on depositors’ demand.
8"Not only does the protection afforded by the FDIC remove any incentive for insured depositors to control excessive
risk-taking, it also removes their incentive to monitor in order to reduce the incidence of fraud and self-dealing." (Macey and
O’Hara 2003, p. 98)
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The literature on executive compensation in the banking industry attends to these particularities. Two
main branches have evolved (Houston and James 1995). The first branch discusses how the sensitivity
of executive compensation to the bank’s performance was affected by the U.S. corporate control market
deregulation (Crawford et al. 1995, Hubbard and Palia 1995, Cuñat and Guadalupe 2009). Since 1980
many states in the U.S. have passed so-called interstate banking laws that allow local banks to be acquired
by out-of-state banks. This has led to higher competition among banks on the interstate market and has
had consequences on the pay-performance relation. The second branch in the literature questions whether
the existing compensation policies promote risk-taking in the banking sector. These studies examine the
relation between the specific component of the compensation and market measures of risk (Houston and
James (1995), Chen et al. (2006)). The results are inconclusive.9
Though limited, the empirical literature on CEO pay in the banking industry provides some insight
about their remuneration practice. The data show that bank CEOs receive less cash compensation on
average, are less likely to participate in a stock option plan, and hold fewer growth options than CEOs
in other industries. These differences are likely to stem from different investment opportunities of banks
(Houston and James 1995). But not all is different in the banking industry. Houston and James (1995)
do not find any differences between banking and non-banking industries regarding the overall sensitivity
of pay to performance. They presume that the factors that influence compensation in the banking in-
dustry are similar to those in non-banking industries despite differences in the compensation structure.
Adams and Mehran (2003) suggest that the difference in the governance structures between manufac-
turing firms and banks are industry-specific. Furthermore, the differences seem to be mostly due to
different investment opportunities of bank holding companies (BHCs) and pertinent regulation (Adams
and Mehran 2003). Adams and Mehran’s study questions if firm performance measures are influenced
by the governance structure. Their results indicate that differences between the board structures of man-
ufacturing firms and banks might not be a reason for concern in this respect. Aebi et al. (2012) study the
strength of incentive features of top management compensation contracts in banks. They compare the
pay-performance sensitivity in banks with those in manufacturing firms and show that debt ratio, firm
size, risk, and regulation are important determinants of pay-performance sensitivity in banks. Finally,
the executive compensation structure and the governance structure of banks differ from firms in other
industries. Even so, the factors that influence the overall pay-performance sensitivity do not seem to
differ significantly across industries.
Studies testing RPE in the banking industry are rare. Barro and Barro (1990) test RPE on a data set
that covers 83 commercial banks in the U.S. between 1982 and 1987. They regress the growth rate of
real compensation on the average of the real total rate of return from the current and previous period,
the first difference of accounting based returns, regional averages for both accounting-based return, and
the average of the real total rate of return. This effectively compares the performance of banks relative
to the performance of other banks in the same region. Their evidence is not consistent with the use of
RPE. Crawford (1999) tests two hypotheses on 215 executives from 118 U.S. commercial banks from
1976-1988. He regresses change in CEO pay for a specific bank on a change in shareholder wealth
for that bank, an industry relative performance measure, and a market performance measure using S&P
500 returns. His findings suggest that relative compensation is negatively related to market and industry
returns and positively related to shareholder returns. In addition, in his sample the use of RPE increases
when the banking deregulation was introduced. Crawford reports evidence consistent with RPE if CEO
compensation is evaluated relative to industry peers. In addition, in his sample the use of RPE increases
upon introduction of banking deregulation. Crawford reports evidence consistent with RPE if CEO
compensation is evaluated relative to industry peers. He does not, however, find evidence of RPE when
using market performance measures.
9For example, Saunders et al. (1990) find evidence for this hypothesis and observe a positive and statistically significant
relation between bank risk and stock held by the executive. In contrast, Houston and James (1995) provide results that are
inconsistent with this hypothesis.
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To sum up, the academic literature on CEO compensation in banking addresses the industry’s char-
acteristics. First, banks differ from other firms in terms of capital structure. Second, deposit insurance,
which is a particularity of banks, can increase the risk of fraud and self dealing since it reduces the in-
centives for monitoring. Against this background, two branches in the academic literature on CEO pay
have evolved. The first one tries to identify the effect of U.S. corporate control market deregulation on
the sensitivity of executive compensation to bank performance. The second branch investigates whether
compensation policies promote risk taking in the banking sector.
2.3 Empirical model
We employ a model that is based on Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). Specifically, we use the following
weak-form test of RPE:10
Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPerf it + α2 · PeerPerf it + α3 ·Cit + it (3)
Compit measures executive compensation in monetary terms, FirmPerf it stands for the performance of
firm i measured as the continuously compounded gross real rate of return to shareholders (assuming that
dividends are reinvested), and PeerPerf it denotes the performance of firm i
′s peer group. In order to
account for variation not included in the firm’s and the peer groups’ performances we include several
control variables, subsumed in the column vector Cit, which account for firm size and growth options.
In addition, we include time, industry, and country dummies. The subscript t denotes the respective year
and it represents an independent firm specific white noise process. Furthermore, α0, α1, α2, and α3
denote model parameters.11
In this model, rejecting the null hypothesis H0 : α2 ≥ 0 against the one-sided alternative H1 : α2 < 0
provides evidence of RPE in executive compensation contracts. In that case, exogenous shocks outside
of the control of the executive management are filtered out from the compensation contract.
The first step in conducting the so-called strong-form test is to regress firm performance on peer
performance (Antle and Smith 1986). For this purpose, we employ a battery of peer performance aggre-
gation methods (see the next section). The first step regression model is:
FirmPerformanceit = γi + βi · PeerPerformanceit + it (4)
The unsystematic and systematic performance are obtained from the equation above in the following
manner:
UnsysFirmPerformanceit = ̂it,
SysFirmPerformanceit = γ̂i + β̂i · PeerPerformanceit.
(5)
Note that ̂it denote regression residuals and γ̂i, β̂i parameter estimates. Since the goal is to differen-
tiate between systematic and unsystematic firm performance, we do not account for control variables in
this step. The second step estimates the sensitivity of CEO compensation with respect to the unsystematic
and systematic components of firm performance, that is:
Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPerformanceit + δ2 · SystFirmPerformanceit + δ3 ·Cit + it (6)
10Originally, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) defined RPE as α2
α1
. They test H0 :
α2
α1
≥ 0 against the alternative H1 : α2α1 < 0.
Since α1 is expected to be positive, most of the literature that uses the model proposed by Holmstrom and Milgrom test whether
α2 < 0. We follow their approach.
11Note that α3 is a row vector.
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If the systematic risk is filtered out from the compensation contract, the systematic performance δ2 in
equation (6) should not be significantly different from zero. Cit denotes a column vector of control
variables and the row vector δ3 its coefficients.
2.3.1 Peer group composition
This section introduces our peer group aggregation method. We adapt the effective industry/size approach
by Albuquerque (2009).
RPE companies assess their CEOs’ compensation levels based on performance in relation to their
respective peers. These peers are not simply a random draw of the market. RPE companies follow a
specific methodology in selecting their peers. Because researchers usually do not know an RPE com-
pany’s peers, they follow a different approach. Most studies assessing RPE use broad industry or market
indices as a comparison group for peer performance. This is not without problems. Firms within an
industry are hardly homogenous in their characteristics, so simple benchmarks are not able to adequately
capture common shocks (Albuquerque 2009).12 This introduces a bias in the statistical estimation and
can distort inferences. An inappropriate comparison group can lead to a higher (or lower) recommended
level of CEO pay, skewing the desired incentives for CEOs. An expedient and replicable comparison
group based on a reasonable and objective criterion is therefore the key element when empirically testing
for RPE.
Albuquerque (2009) provides a pragmatical solution for the ex post composition of RPE peer groups.
She constructs groups based on both the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) level
and firm size. The first step in her construction sorts firms by beginning-of-year market value into size
quartiles within an industry. This yields four peer groups per industry. Each firm is then matched with an
industry-size peer group. It turns out that this approach yields stronger empirical support for the use of
RPE in executive compensation than sorting by industry classification alone, an improvement that is due
to the information that firm size captures. Firms of similar size are also similar along several other char-
acteristics that proxy for systematic risk. Albuquerque shows how the levels of diversification, financing
constraints, and operating leverage vary with industry-size-ranked portfolios and provides evidence that
firm size subsumes these characteristics. She finds that larger firms tend to be more diversified, have
greater operating leverage, and smaller financing constraints. This claim is supported by other literature.
Demsetz and Strahan (1997), for instance, construct a measure of diversification of BHCs. Their results
establish a strong, positive effect of bank size on the diversification of BHCs. Moreover, small firms tend
to face bigger financial constraints in comparison to large ones. In agreement with Albuquerque we do
not argue that firm size fully captures systematic risk. But it is a proxy with high explanatory power for
the common uncertainty that Holmstrom (1982) insinuated.
3 Data description
This section describes the data preparation process in creating our sample of international banks. Sub-
section 3.1 reports the collection of the international compensation data, Subsection 3.2 provides details
about the sample that we use in the regression analysis, and Subsection 3.3 documents the peer group
data selection process.
12Jensen and Murphy (1990) aggregate peer performance based on the two-digit SIC level or a market index, Janakiraman
et al. (1992) match their peers on the same two-digit SIC industry level. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) use two-, three-, and
four-digit SIC levels in order to compose a peer group, and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) choose peers in the same two-,
three- and four-digit SIC level industry or a market index.
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3.1 Compensation data
There is no standardized database for international corporate executive compensation. We collect data
from several sources for the years 2003-2014. Financial and accounting data are obtained from Thom-
son Reuters Datastream and Thomson Reuters Worldscope. Compensation data are collected manually
either from annual reports or management proxy circulars available online, except for the U.S. which
we exclude from our analysis. In August 2006 a new regulatory requirement by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission mandated, among other things, full disclosure of peer group compositions (if ap-
plicable) for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2006. In a recent study, Faulkender and Yang
(2013) suggest that this event generated a structural break in peer group selection, discouraging the use
of U.S. compensation data for our purpose.13 For the other countries in our sample, we could not find
any corresponding regulation that was introduced in our observed timeframe.14
Our initial data set is composed of firms classified as banks from the FTSE All World Index with an
index weight higher than 0.02. This yields 75 firms. Based on this list we collect remuneration data for
42 different firms with a total of 318 firm-year observations (henceforth dubbed the "full sample"). In
line with the source information, we quantify the compensation in nominal terms. As CEO compensation
we define the compensation paid by the parent company as well as the one paid by subsidiaries (for the
CEO position). In rare cases firms only provide a certain wage range. In that case we always include the
higher bound as the actual compensation. We do not include the measure of CEO compensation changes
in the value of existing firm options and stock holdings owned by the CEO.
In order to collect the total compensation data we focus on the amount the firm itself defines as
the "total". This always includes all the positions used for the fixed compensation amount as well as
performance-related components. The name and the exact composition of these performance-related
components vary significantly between firms. For example, some firms differentiate between long-term
and short-term incentives, whereas others just talk about bonuses. This seems to be related to the pertain-
ing country and its national regulations. We ignore any extraordinary compensation such as restricted
shares (which had been allocated when starting as CEO), payment in lieu of notice, or buyout. We also
exclude all amounts received related to the holding of a director position in addition to the CEO position.
In addition to the compensation data we collect information to create a dummy variable that indicates
the disclosure of a comparison or peer group in a company’s CEO remuneration policy. We translate
such disclosure as indication of RPE usage and examine the subsample of thusly disclosing firms in
Section 4.2. We then identify possible drivers of disclosure in Section 5. Note that this approach is
less excluding than a strict requirement of overt RPE claims, and would therefore also pick up simple
benchmarking (for details on the difference between RPE and benchmarking, see Gong et al. 2011). This
runs the risk of not rejecting the null hypothesis even if it is false. If we do find evidence against the null
hypothesis, however, we can be quite confident that disclosure has a significant impact.
3.2 International banking sample
We convert all compensation data into U.S. Dollars by using exchange rates from Thomson Reuters
Datastream. The exchange rate is determined by the day after the end of the fiscal year (e.g., if the fiscal
year ends on December 31, 2010, we take the exchange rate on January 1, 2011). We measure firm
performance with stock market return data from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Following the literature,
we control for firm size (sales) (Smith and Watts 1992, Fama and French 1992) and growth opportunities
(Fama and French 1992). In addition, we include dummies to control for year-specific differences in the
level of compensation, industry dummies that capture unobservable variation at the industry level, and
country dummies that capture any country specific variation (e.g., due to different regulations or legal
13We retain U.S. banks as possible peers, however. See Section 3.3.
14For E.U. firms, for example, Ferrarini and Moloney (2005, p. 318) point out that peer group disclosure is not required.
We are not aware that this has changed since 2005.
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directives). In order to control for this possible country specific heterogeneity, we only keep banks from
countries with at least two banks.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the sample frequency for each year. Altogether, the data are equally well
distributed over the years 2004-2013, though the frequency of the data tends to increase somewhat over
time.15
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Panel B of Table 1 displays the sample frequency by industry group within the banking industry.
Subsector 6029 (Commercial Banks) dominates the sample with more than 80% of all observations.
The other subsectors are National Commercial Banks (6021), State Commercial Banks (6022), Federal
Saving Institutions (6035), and Security Brokers and Dealers (6211). Panel C of Table 1 depicts the
sample frequency by country. Among the 14 countries in the sample, Canada together with Australia,
Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom provide the largest shares of our banks.
Table 2 shows Pearson correlation coefficients between performance measures and the control vari-
ables firm size and growth options. Firm stock returns and industry as well as industry/size peers display
positive correlations (0.73 and 0.80, respectively). The correlation of firm stock returns with its industry
peer is lower than the correlation of firm stock returns with its industry/size peer, which is consistent
with previous evidence (Albuquerque 2009). The statistically significant correlation coefficients increase
our confidence that that industry and industry/size peers are eligible candidates to filter out noise from
the individually observed firm performance measures.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
3.3 Peer Group Composition
For the selection of possible peer firms, we start with a comprehensive list of 4,228 firms, most of which
are financials. We use SIC-codes to remove firms which do not belong to the banking industry.16 We
also exclude other firms which we do not consider valid peers, such as the Allied Irish Banks, which
technically became state-owned during the financial crisis. We then apply a number of screens to the
return data to obtain a qualitatively sound data set (Ince and Porter 2006). First, we delete any consec-
utive zero returns at the end of the sample period. Second, we remove returns below -80% and above
300%. We also require that the one-year continuously compounded return obtained from monthly data
is available. We end up with 1,570 firms which form the pool of potential peers in our analyses. Note
that this sample also contains so-called "dead stocks" which were delisted from the stock market during
the sample period to mitigate survivorship bias.
4 Results
4.1 Full sample results
This section presents the results for the full sample of banks. First, we show descriptive statistics of
compensation data, performance measures, and firm characteristics (Subsection 4.1.1) for the 42 firms
across the 2004-2013 time span. Subsection 4.1.2 then documents the regression results. We regress
15The low number of firms in the last year is because not all firms in our sample had yet released proxy circulars by the time
we collected the data.
16Datastream provides up to five different SIC codes for each firm, in order of relevance. We include a firm if the first SIC
code is one of the following: 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035, 6036, 6061, 6062, 6081, 6082, 6091, 6111, 6141, 6159, 6162, or 6712.
If the first SIC code is either 6311, 6211, 6153, 6163, or 6221, we include the firm only if one of the four other SIC-codes is in
the previous list.
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the logarithm of total CEO compensation on firm stock performance, peer return, and several control
variables.
4.1.1 Summary statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. We report two measures of compensation: total
compensation and the logarithm of total compensation. In the regression analysis, we use the logarithm
of total compensation as a dependent variable because its empirical distribution is more symmetrical
than the one for total compensation. This mitigates heteroscedasticity as well as extreme skewness
and allows for a direct comparison with results from previous studies (Murphy 1999). We aggregate
peer performance based on industry affiliation and on the industry/size approach (Albuquerque 2009).
Summary statistics for the control variables firm size (log of sales and sales) and growth options are also
reported. The results show that the average (median) total compensation of an executive in our sample
is USD 5.44 million (USD 4.31 million), which is not all that surprising in a sample that largely consists
of the major global players in the banking industry.17 Firm performance is measured using log-returns.
The mean firm stock return is 6% and the median is 14%. Averages of peer returns hover around 8%.
The average (median) size of a bank in our full sample is USD 30,240 million (USD 19,225 million).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
4.1.2 Regression results
We proceed to test the use of RPE in CEO compensation with equation (3). Peer groups are constructed
with the industry and industry/size approach. We then regress the logarithm of total CEO compensation
on firm stock return, peer return, growth options, and log of sales. Year, country, and industry dummies
are also included.
Panel A of Table 4 shows the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to RPE when using industry and
industry/size peer groups. The coefficient on firm stock return is positive and statistically significant at the
1% level for both peer group specifications, with values of 0.47 and 0.56 for the industry and industry/size
specifications, respectively. When the peer group is restricted to firms within the same industry the
coefficient of the peer portfolio is negative yet insignificant (-0.06 with a p-value of 0.78). Put differently,
the performance of these peers does not seem to be filtered out from the CEO compensation contracts.
However, if we include size into sorting and consider industry/size peers, the parameter estimates are
negative and statistically significant (with a coefficient of -0.31 and a p-value of 0.09). Even so, we
consider this result only as moderate evidence of RPE. The peer group coefficient is significant at the
10% level (5% if we use the more suited one-sided test) but robustness checks with self-created size
sorting algorithms yield mixed results.18
[Insert Table 4 about here]
By and large, the results for our international banks dovetail with previous findings for U.S. firms,
which also showed that industry/size peers are better able to capture exogenous shocks than industry
peers alone (Albuquerque 2009).
17See C for a list of the banks in our analysis.
18Although the results are robust across different treatments of standard errors (see B for more details), we are not able
to document robustness when we generalize Albuquerque’s (2009) simple sorting specification. Specifically, we implement a
novel Kernel-based peer group construction approach with three different Kernel-functions: a standard normal pdf (Knor), a
”cosine” pdf (Kcos), and a uniform distribution pdf (Kuni). These generalized approaches give different weights depending
on the peers’ size ”distance” from the target firm’s size. The results from these new specifications are reported in Table A1
in A.3. For additional robustness checks we use the iterative peer group specification. The results from this new specification
is reported in Panel A of the Table A2 in A.3.
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4.2 RPE subsample results
4.2.1 Weak tests of RPE
The results above are moderately consistent with the notion that the banks in our full sample compensate
according to an RPE scheme. We now turn to the informational value of peer disclosure. Although there
is a risk of taking such disclosure at face value, we exploit this information to sharpen our sample’s
profile. In this subsection we test the sensitivity of CEO pay to RPE in the subsample of banks that
explicitly state the use of peers in determining the performance of their CEOs in their statement proxies
(see Section 3.1). We follow the same empirical specification used in the previous section and take a
closer look at 25 disclosing banks, which form 156 firm-year observations from 2004-2013.
Panel B of Table 4 shows the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to RPE in the subsample when
using industry and industry/size peers. The results show positive and statistically significant parameter
estimates on firm stock performance for both peer group specifications. The estimates are 0.49 and 0.68,
respectively, indicating that a CEO is being rewarded for positive firm performance. Hence on average,
CEO compensation increases with firm performance. When the peer groups are composed of banks
within the same industry, the coefficient on the peer portfolio is negative and statistically insignificant
(with a coefficient of -0.30 and a p-value of 0.40). The industry/size parameter estimate is also negative
but statistically significant at the 5% level (with a coefficient of -0.64 and a p-value of 0.03; or 0.015
when we use the one-sided test). What is more, in contrast to the full sample, this result is robust across
different self-created specifications of peer groups.19 This goes hand in hand with our previous results
and once again suggests that the industry/size approach captures more variation. The results for the
subsample of disclosing banks provide again evidence consistent with RPE, but more strikingly so than
the results for the full sample did. In the subsample, the coefficient on the peer portfolio doubles in size
and increases sharply in statistical significance. Accounting for disclosure increases the precision of the
estimates, suggesting that peer group disclosure holds informational value regarding RPE. One might
also say that the inclusion of non-disclosing banks in the full sample dilutes the statistical inference and
renders it less conclusive by lowering statistical power.20 This stands in contrast to Gong et al. (2011),
who find no informational value of RPE disclosure. However, their sample only comprises U.S. firms
for one year.
4.2.2 Strong-form test of RPE
Following Antle and Smith (1986), we perform so-called strong-form tests of RPE on the subsample
of RPE disclosures to verify the robustness of our results. Strong-form tests of RPE examine whether
all the noise that can be removed is indeed filtered out from the compensation contracts. Details on
the construction of systematic and unsystematic firm performances and the employed empirical model
are reported in Section 2.3. In a nutshell, the results are consistent with RPE if only the unsystematic
performance exerts influence on CEO pay, and not the systematic one.
Panel C of Table 4 documents the regression results from equation (6) for the subsample of dis-
closing banks. Here we regress the logarithm of CEO compensation on unsystematic firm performance,
systematic firm performance, and control variables for 156 firm-year observations over the time span
2004-2013. In that specification we rely on industry/size groups for constructing the systematic perfor-
mance variable. The systematic component is insignificant with a coefficient estimate of 0.14 (p-value
= 0.47). The unsystematic performance variable, however, is positive and statistically significant with
a coefficient of 0.68 (p-value = 0.00). This suggests that the CEOs in our subsample are being com-
19For more details see Panel B of Table A1 and Table A2 in A.4.
20Untabulated results for the non-disclosing subsample support this reasoning. On their own, non-disclosing banks do not
seem to make use of RPE.
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pensated for unsystematic performance only.21 These results provide evidence in accord with the use of
strong-form RPE and reinforce the previous finding that CEOs are not being compensated for systematic
performance in the subsample of RPE disclosures.
5 What drives RPE in the banking industry?
Prior studies have put forth a variety of factors that influence the usage of RPE in compensation contracts
(Carter et al. 2009, Gong et al. 2011, Albuquerque 2014). These studies focus on RPE usage in U.K. or
U.S. firms. They do not, however, examine the influence of one factor at a time on the usage of RPE
while controlling for other factors. Gong et al. (2011) investigate explicit disclosures on RPE in the U.S.
to identify the factors that prompt the use of RPE in compensation contracts in 2006. Carter et al. (2009)
examine the use of RPE in performance-vested equity grants in a sample of U.K. firms in 2002. This
section addresses this gap and examines international firms over a longer time span. Understanding what
drives RPE is instructive for its potential effect on RPE testing and could offer yet another reason for the
mixed evidence in existing empirical studies.
In order to pinpoint possible RPE drivers we conduct a logit regression. The dependent variable yit
is an indicator variable that equals 1 for banks that disclose information in their proxy statements on
the use of a peer group to determine the level of executive compensation, and 0 otherwise (see Sec-
tion 3.1). The independent variables include CEO pay (Compit), firm performance (FirmPerf it), various
specifications of peer return (PeerPerf it), and control variables. We control for firm size (FirmSizeit)
and growth options (GrowthOptionsit) and include year (YearDummyit), industry (IndustryDummyit),
and country (CountryDummyit) dummies to control for cross-sectional variation. Sales are used as a
proxy for the firm size. Growth options are calculated as follows: (Market Equity + Total Assets −
Common Equity)/Total Assets.
We estimate our logit model based on the following latent variable model:
yit = γ0 + γ1 · Compit + γ2 · FirmPerf it + γ3 · PeerPerf it + γ4 · FirmSizeit
+ γ5 · GrowthOptionsit + γ7 · YearDummyit + γ8 · IndustryDummyit
+ γ9 · CountryDummyit + it.
(7)
In order to estimate equation (7), we use the full sample of 318 firm-year observations from 2004-
2013. Table 5 reports the results. We find that the likelihood of using RPE is positively related to firm
size and negatively related to growth options for industry and industry/size peers.22 In other words, the
probability that a bank will use RPE is increasing with firm size. The opposite holds for growth options.
None of the other predictors are statistically significant, suggesting that size and growth options are the
main drivers of RPE in our sample.23
[Insert Table 5 about here]
These results are in line with existing evidence. Gong et al. (2011) find that larger firms are more
likely to use RPE. Firm size could represent a crude proxy for public scrutiny and shareholder concerns
about compensation practices. Large firms are also more exposed to monitoring pressure in comparison
to smaller ones. This might well force them to be more committed to RPE (Bannister and Newman 2003).
21These results are again robust. See Panel C of Table A1 and Table A2 in A.5.
22Strictly speaking we do not examine the likelihood of using RPE but the more encompassing likelihood of disclosing peer
groups. This translates into a conservative estimation. Because peer group usage is only a necessary condition for RPE, our
findings are reflecting a lower likelihood bound of using RPE.
23The regression results based on our self-created Kernel-based peer group specifications are presented in Table A3 in A.6
and are similar to the results in this section.
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Albuquerque (2014) and Gong et al. (2011) find that the level of RPE in CEO compensation contracts is
negatively associated with a firm’s level of growth options. Carter et al. (2009) examine the disclosure
of performance-based conditions in equity grants and document that growth options are inversely related
to the performance-based conditions. Albuquerque (2014) argues that high growth options firms have
to bear more risks and thus exhibit a higher idiosyncratic variance. These firms are also characterized
by firm-specific know-how and operate in markets with high barriers to entry. As a consequence, these
characteristics make peer performance non-informative with respect to capturing external shocks. This
eventually leads to less usage of RPE among high growth options firms (Albuquerque 2014, p.1).
6 Conclusion
This papers tests the presence of RPE in a novel sample of 42 international non-U.S. banks from 2004
to 2013. To that end, we regress the logarithm of total compensation on firm performance, industry and
industry/size peer performance, and control variables such as firm size and growth options. We control
for unobservable variation in the level of compensation across years, industries, and countries. When we
account for peer groups, with peer selection based on industry and firm size, we find moderate evidence
for the use of RPE in international banking. This evidence becomes stronger and more robust once we
focus on banks who openly disclose the use of peers in their renumeration practice. This insight contrasts
and complements previous findings for the U.S.
These overarching findings suggest four things. First, large international banks seem to entertain the
use of RPE in assessing the performance of their CEOs. This holds even more likely for peer group
disclosing banks. The latter implies the second point: Disclosure statements seem to have some merit,
at least in our sample, and credibly reflect good corporate practice on that score. Boasting firms do not
seem to limit themselves to preaching water; they likely drink it, too. Third, in our sample empirical
evidence on RPE runs the risk of diluting in undifferentiated data. It is worthwhile, if nothing else for
robustness, to stratify by disclosure. Finally, in line with previous studies our evidence indicates that
industry/size peers are better able to capture exogenous shocks than industry peers alone.
In order to identify possible drivers of RPE in international banking, we employ a logit regression
model. The evidence supports the working theory that growth options and firm size play a crucial role
in banks’ decisions to use RPE. Our results are robust to different model specifications and dovetail with
existing evidence. We find that the likelihood of RPE usage is decreasing with growth options. The
implementation of RPE in high growth option banks might be too costly due to difficulties in identifying
the correct peer group, rendering such banks less likely to use RPE. We also find that larger banks are
more inclined to use RPE in their compensation contracts. This is hardly surprising. In light of the recent
financial crisis, high levels of CEO compensation have attracted a lot of attention and large banks in
particular have been under significant monitoring and shareholder pressure. In response to such pressure,
large banks are more likely to have become incentivized to be committed to RPE use in determining the
level of CEO pay.
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Table 1: Sample frequency by year, SIC level, and country
Panel A: Sample frequency by year
Year Frequency Percent
2004 14 4.40
2005 22 6.92
2006 26 8.18
2007 32 10.06
2008 33 10.38
2009 38 11.95
2010 40 12.58
2011 42 13.21
2012 41 12.89
2013 30 9.43
Panel B: Sample frequency by SIC level
SIC Level Frequency Percent
6021 21 6.60
6022 8 2.52
6029 272 85.53
6035 10 3.14
6211 7 2.20
Panel C: Sample frequency by country
Country Frequency Percent
Australia 30 9.43
Canada 52 16.35
China 16 5.03
France 24 7.55
Germany 19 5.97
Hong Kong 9 2.83
Malaysia 19 5.97
Norway 10 3.14
Singapore 30 9.43
South Africa 14 4.40
Spain 20 6.29
Sweden 33 10.38
Switzerland 13 4.09
United Kingdom 29 9.12
Note: Panel A shows the sample frequency by year for the full sample. We report the year, the frequency of the sample
observation for each year, and the the yearly percentage of the overall sample. Panel B shows the sample frequency by SIC
level for the full sample. We report the SIC level, the frequency of the sample observation for each SIC level, and the SIC
percentage of the overall sample. Panel C shows the sample frequency by country for the full sample. We report the country,
the frequency of the sample observation for each country, and the country percentage of the overall sample.
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Table 2: Pearson correlation coefficients
Firm stock return Industry Peer Return Industry/Size Peer Return Log(Sales)
Firm stock return 1.00
Industry Peer Return 0.73* 1.00
Industry/Size Peer Return 0.80* 0.96* 1.00
Log(Sales) −0.19* −0.09 −0.08 1.00
Growth Options 0.42* 0.29* 0.28* −0.48*
Note: This table shows Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between performance measures and control variables.
The sample consists of 318 observations covering the time period 2004-2013. A star indicates significance at the 1% level.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean St.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Total Compensation 318 5.44 4.07 0.24 2.05 4.31 8.41 20.40
Log(Total Compensation) 318 8.25 0.93 5.46 7.62 8.37 9.04 9.92
Firm stock return 318 0.06 0.43 -1.59 -0.06 0.14 0.29 1.24
Peer return (Industry) 318 0.09 0.26 -0.72 -0.12 0.15 0.25 0.86
Peer return (Industry/Size) 318 0.08 0.31 -0.83 -0.07 0.16 0.27 0.53
Firm size (Sales) 318 30, 240 33, 396 1, 011 7, 450 19, 225 49, 384 142, 752
Firm size (log(Sales)) 318 16.76 1.12 13.83 15.82 16.77 17.72 18.78
Growth options 318 1.04 0.04 0.96 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.19
Firm Stock Return Variance 318 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.19 1.09
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of the compensation data, firm performance measures, and control variables.
Specifically, we document firm stock return and peer return. Summary statistics for peer groups are based on an industry
affiliation and an industry/size quartiles approach. We report the number of firm observations (N), mean (Mean), minimum
(Min), standard deviation (St.Dev.), 25th Percentile (Q1), median (Median), 75th Percentile (Q3), and maximum (Max) for the
time span 2004-2013. Total Compensation and Sales are in million USD.
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Table 4: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Panel A: Weak-Form RPE Tests Panel B: Weak-Form RPE Tests Panel C: Strong-Form RPE Tests
– Full Sample – Disclosure Subsample – Disclosure Subsample
Independent Variables Industry Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group Industry Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group
Intercept 3.18* 3.22* -3.37 -2.78 -2.81
(0.08) (0.08) (0.34) (0.42) (0.42)
Firm stock return 0.47*** 0.56*** 0.49** 0.68***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Peer return(Industry) -0.06 -0.30
(0.78) (0.40)
Peer return (Industry/Size) -0.31* -0.64**
(0.09) (0.03)
Unsystematic Firm Perf 0.68***
(0.00)
Systematic Firm Perf 0.14
(0.47)
Firm size (sales) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.68***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth options -0.59 -0.61 0.17 -0.03 -0.03
(0.65) (0.64) (0.95) (0.99) (0.99)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 76.31% 76.53% 63.47% 64.64% 64.64%
Number of observations 318 318 156 156 156
Note: Panel A and B show OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 +α1 ·FirmPer fit +α2 ·PeerPer fit +α3 ·Cit + it. The first and third column show the results from regressing
log of total CEO compensation on stock return, peer performance composed of the firms within the same industry, and control variables. The second and fourth column document regression
results based on the industry/size quartiles peer group approach by Albuquerque (2009). Panel A shows the results for the full sample, and Panel B reports the results for the disclosure
subsample. Panel C documents OLS regression results for the equation Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPer f ormanceit + δ2 · S ystFirmPer f ormanceit + δ3 · Cit + it on the subsample of
disclosing banks. We regress logarithm of CEO compensation on the unsystematic firm performance, systematic firm performance, and control variables for 156 firm-year observations
over the time span 2004-2013. We use industry/size peer group specification in order to construct a systematic performance variable. All regressions include year, industry, and country
dummies. For more details on systematic and unsystematic variable construction see Section 2.3. Significance levels are two-sided and denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10%
(∗). The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
19
Table 5: Logit regression of RPE use in executive compensation contracts
Independent Variables Industry Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group
Intercept -25.52 -26.08
(0.13) (0.12)
Compensation 0.47 0.46
(0.38) (0.38)
Firm Perf 0.00 -0.27
(0.99) (0.75)
Peer return(Industry) 0.10
(0.95)
Peer return (Industry/Size) 0.89
(0.53)
Firm size (sales) 2.71*** 2.69***
(0.00) (0.00)
Growth options -19.66* -19.39*
(0.09) (0.10)
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Country dummies yes yes
R2 51.71% 51.79%
Number of observations 318 318
Note: Table documents logit regression results for the equation yit = γ0+γ1 ·Compit +γ2 ·FirmPer fit +γ3 ·PeerPer fit +γ4 ·Cit +it.
The dependent variable is RPE, an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm discloses peer group use in the compensation
contracts. We regress RPE on firm performance, peer returns, firm size, and growth options for 318 firm-year observations
over the time span 2004-2013. We also include year, country, and industry dummies in the regression estimation for two
specifications, industry and industry/size peers. We report the Cox and Snell’s R2. Significance levels are denoted as follows:
1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
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A Appendix
A.1 Kernel-based peer group construction
This section points to some issues one might have with the industry/size approach and introduces a novel
Kernel-based alternative. This method extends Albuquerque (2009) with a more rigorous peer group
selection. We show that there is room for improvement by generalising the industry/size approach.
An example will highlight a possible caveat of the industry/size quartile approach. In Albuquerque
(2009), all firms are partitioned and ranked into four size groups (per industry). In ascending order, the
first group contains 25% of the firms with the smallest size, and the fourth group contains 25% of the
firms with the biggest size. The boundaries between the four groups, the so-called breakpoints, thus lie
on 25%, 50%, and 75% of the ranked values of firm size. Now let us assume that we want to test the
RPE hypothesis on a target company that is very close to the breakpoint between the first and the second
quartile, but just happens to fall into the first one. In this particular case it is not readily obvious why the
first peer group, and not the second one, should be assigned to the target firm. Our alternative method of
peer group composition addresses this issue. For every target firm, we assign a unique peer group that is
determined by the target firm’s size. We implement this with a Kernel-based weighting scheme. Firms
that are closer to the target firm in terms of firm size receive a weight specific to the distance from the
target firm. In general, a weighting function assigns a higher weight to a peer firm if it exhibits a smaller
distance to the target firm in terms of firm size (we will also allow for equal weights). We measure the
differences of the firm sizes in the following manner:
Di = SizeT − Sizei where i = 1, ...,N (8)
SizeT denotes the size of the target company measured in terms of firm sales, and Sizei is a proxy for the
size of all other firms. We standardize the ”distances” by dividing them with the cross-sectional standard
deviation, s(Di):
D∗i =
Di
s(Di)
where i = 1, ...,N (9)
From these standardized distances, we construct weights using a kernel weighting function. The firm i
in the sample of N firms will be assigned the weight
wi = K(D∗i ) (10)
Additionally, we create weights by multiplying the standardized difference with the following scaling
factor (SF):
SFi = Median
(
s(Sizei)
s(SizeT )
)
· 2 (11)
D∗∗i = D
∗
i · SF (12)
wi = K(D∗∗i ) (13)
For robustness we use three types of kernel functions to assign weights: 1) The probability density
function (pdf) of the Standard Normal Distribution, 2) the pdf of the Uniform Distribution, and 3) the
pdf of the ”Cosine Distribution”.24 In addition, we standardize each weight with the sum of all weights.
24There is no Cosine Distribution to our knowledge, but if there was one this would be its probability density function.
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This amounts to the following peer performance weight:
wi∗ =
wi∑N
j=1 w j
(14)
such that
N∑
i=1
wi∗ = 1 (15)
Finally, we use the performance weights and individual firm performance Perfi in order to construct each
target firm’s peer group as follows:
Peer Perf =
N∑
i=1
w∗i · Perfi where i = 1, ...,N (16)
A.2 Iterative peer group construction
For additional robustness we follow a complementary way of creating peer groups in applying the fol-
lowing iterative algorithm. This iterative approach was introduced by Dikolli et al. (2013) and Black
et al. (2015).
In a fist step, we measure the correlation between the performance measures of the target firm j and
other firms in the sample over a specific time period, t = 1, ...,T and for i = 1, ...,N comparison firms.25
Corr(Per f jt, Per fit) (17)
Second, we start the iterative algorithm by regressing the performance of every firm in the sample on the
average performance of all the other firms in the sample (including the target firm), (Perf Average):
Per fi = ai + bi · Per fAverage + ei where i = 1, ...,N and ei ∼ N(0, σ2) (18)
The third step consists of checking the statistical significance of the parameter estimate b.
In a fourth step, if the parameter estimate turns out to be insignificant, we reduce the sample size to
the new value Nnew:
Nnew = (k+1)· N3 · k where k = 1, 2, 3... is the index of the k
th reduction of the original sample (19)
We perform the same regression as before on the reduced sample size:
Per fi = ai + bi · Per fAverage + ei where i = 1, j, ...,Nnew and ei ∼ N(0, σ2) (20)
In case the parameter estimates are significant we increase our sample by adding one firm Nnew = Nnew+1
and repeat the same regression with a new number of firms in our sample, Nnew. We repeat this step until
the bi coefficient is insignificant. Once this condition is achieved, we stop the iteration.
Based on the parameter estimates obtained in this process, similar to Dikolli et al. (2013) and Black
25We throw away firms with less than 25 joint observations with the target firm and firms with a standard deviation of zero,
excluding NAs. We replace zero or negative total assets (proxy for firm size) with NAs.
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et al. (2015), we construct the performance weight for the firm i in our sample:
w?i =
bi
σi∑N
i=1
bi
σi
(21)
Now we aggregate the peer group performance for the firm i:26
Peer Per f =
N∑
i=1
w?i · Per fi −
N∑
i=1
w?i · ai (22)
A.3 Full sample of banks
Panel A of Table A1 reports the results from regressing the logarithm of total compensation on firm stock
return, Kernel-based peers, growth options, and log of sales. The parameter estimates are negative and
insignificant, which is not consistent with the presence of RPE. The estimates hardly differ across several
Kernel specifications. They are -0.26 (p-value = 0.38) for the normal Kernel function, -0.16 (p-value =
0.54) for the cosine Kernel function, and -0.20 (p-value = 0.48) for the uniform Kernel function. In
Panel A of Table A1 we have slightly adjusted the Kernel-based approach by multiplying the difference
of the firm size by the scaling factor introduced in the previous section. We test the presence of RPE by
regressing the log of total CEO compensation on firm stock return, peer performance, growth options,
and log of sales. We also include year, country, and industry dummies. The coefficient on the log of
firm stock return is again positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for every specification.
The negative coefficients on the Kernel-based peer portfolio keep persisting. They are -0.22 (p-value
= 0.39) for the normal Kernel function, -0.20 (p-value=0.38) for the cosine Kernel function, and -0.27
(p-value=0.29) for the uniform Kernel function. The adjusted Kernel-based approach reports smaller
p-values. The coefficients remain insignificant, revealing no evidence of RPE in the full sample. Panel
A of Table A2 dovetails these results. The panel documents the results from regressing the logarithm
of total compensation on firm stock return, iterative peers, growth options, and log of sales. We also
include year, country, and industry dummies. The parameter estimate on peer return is again negative
and insignificant, lending no support for RPE hypothesis.
[Insert Table A1 about here]
[Insert Table A2 about here]
A.4 Weak tests of RPE (disclosure subsample)
Panels B of Table A1 and Table A2 document the same regression procedure on the subsample of banks
that explicitly disclose the use of peers in determining their level of CEO compensation. Panel B of
Table A1 reports results when the Kernel-based peers are employed, whereas Panel B of Table A2 doc-
uments results based on iterative peer group approach. Under the Kernel-based peer group specification,
external shocks are removed from the compensation contract, which is consistent with RPE. The peer
coefficients do not differ much across the Kernel specifications. They are -0.99 (p-value = 0.03) for the
26This peer group method allows for the creation of the Market–Adjusted Performance Indicator (MAPI) developed by
FehrAdvice & Partners AG. It is calculated in the following manner: The firm performance of the target company (Perf target f irm)
is regressed against the above established iterative peer group performance: Perf target f irm = αtarget firm + βtarget firm · Peer Perf +
target firm. The estimated coefficients obtained from this regression procedure are used for the MAPI calculation: MAPItarget firm =
Perf target f irm − βˆtarget firm · Peer Perf − αˆtarget firm.
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normal Kernel function, -0.81 (p-value = 0.05) for the ”cosine” Kernel function, and -0.88 (p-value =
0.06) for the uniform Kernel function. The coefficient on firm stock performance is positive and statis-
tically significant and range from 0.70 to 0.77. Panel B of Table A1 also reports the regression results
with the adjusted Kernel-based peers (columns labeled ”scaled”). All the Kernel-based peer coefficients
keep a negative and statistically significant sign, soundly rejecting the null hypothesis of no RPE. The
coefficient of the normal Kernel peer group is -0.82 (p-value = 0.03), of the cosine Kernel peer group
-0.83 (p-value = 0.01), and of the uniform Kernel peer group -0.77 (p-value = 0.04). This evidence is
supported by the results presented in Panel B of Table A2. Under the iterative peer group specification,
the coefficient on peer return is -0.60 and statistically significant (p-value=0.05).
A.5 Strong-form tests of RPE (disclosure subsample)
We now use strong-form RPE tests in order to test the RPE hypothesis on the disclosing subsample.
We use the Kernel-based method in order to construct a systematic performance variable and run the
same regression model. Panel C of Table A1 reports the results. In an additional robustness check, we
employ the iterative peer group and report the results in Panel C of Table A2. We document insignificant
parameter estimates on systematic firm performance. The coefficient of the normal Kernel peer group
is 0.04 (p-value = 0.85), of the cosine Kernel peer group 0.08 (p-value = 0.70), and of the uniform
Kernel peer group 0.09 (p-value = 0.65). Our results are robust to different specifications of the weights
in the Kernel-based approach, which is reported in Panel C of Table A1. The parameter estimates of
the normal Kernel peer group is 0.07 (p-value = 0.75), of the cosine Kernel peer group 0.01 (p-value =
0.96), and of the uniform Kernel peer group 0.09 (p-value = 0.66). The unsystematic firm performance
is significant at the 1% level for every Kernel-based specification. The results do not differ much when
the iterative peer group approach is used. We again report insignificant parameter estimate on systematic
firm performance. The coefficient is -0.26 (p-value=0.45).
A.6 The drivers of RPE
In this section we estimate equation (7). For this purpose, as in the previous section, we use the alternative
peer group definitions based on the kernel and iterative approach. The results are presented in Table A3.
The parameter estimates on firm size remain statistically significant and have the same sign. The firm
size coefficient of the normal Kernel peer group is 2.68 (p-value = 0.00), of the cosine Kernel peer group
2.70 (p-value = 0.00), for the uniform Kernel peer group 2.69 (p-value = 0.00), and for the iterative peer
groups is 2.70 (p-value=0.00). The coefficient for growth options remains negative and in most cases
statistically significant, lending further support to our results. The results are qualitatively similar when
we use the adjusted Kernel-based and iterative approach. The coefficients are -19.64 (p-value = 0.09) for
the normal Kernel peer group, -19.28 (p-value = 0.10) for the cosine Kernel peer group, for the uniform
Kernel peer group -19.74 (p-value = 0.09), and -20.08 for the iterative peer group (p-value=0.08).
[Insert Table A3 about here]
B Clustered standard errors
Here we consider the same regression procedure (equation (3)) for the full sample of 42 banks but include
clustered standard errors across industry codes. Table B1 reports the regression results when peers are
based on industry and industry/size. The coefficient on industry peer is -0.06 (p-value = 0.87), and the
coefficient on industry/size peers is -0.31 (p-value = 0.06). That is to say, we find qualitatively similar
results to those presented in Panel A of Table 4. In addition, in unreported results we find that the results
for the Kernel-based approaches are robust to the inclusion of clustered standard errors.
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[Insert Table B1 about here]
C Banks in our sample
[Insert Table C1 about here]
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Table A1: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Panel A: Weak Form RPE Tests – Full Sample Panel B: Weak Form RPE Tests – Disclosure Subsample Panel C: Strong Form RPE Tests – Disclosure Subsample
unscaled scaled unscaled scaled unscaled scaled
Independent Variables Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni
Intercept 3.27* 3.28* 3.26* 3.36* 3.37* 3.43* -3.21 -3.21 -3.22 -2.82 -2.91 -2.63 -3.27 -3.26 -3.28 -2.86 -2.94 -2.67
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.40) (0.38) (0.44) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.40) (0.38) (0.43)
Firm stock return 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.74***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Peer return -0.26 -0.16 -0.20 -0.22 -0.20 -0.27 -0.99** -0.81* -0.88* -0.82** -0.83** -0.77**
(0.38) (0.54) (0.48) (0.39) (0.38) (0.29) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Unsystematic Firm Perf 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.74***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Systematic Firm Perf 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.09
(0.85) (0.70) (0.65) (0.75) (0.96) (0.66)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 76.39% 76.35% 76.36% 76.39% 76.39% 76.44% 65.20% 65.00% 64.81% 65.16% 65.63% 65.63% 65.20% 65.00% 64.81% 65.16% 65.63% 65.11%
Number of observations 318 318 318 318 318 318 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156
Note: The Table shows OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPer fit + α2 · PeerPer fit + α3 ·Cit + it (weak-form RPE test). We report the results from regressing
log of total CEO compensation on stock return and peer performance aggregated based on the Kernel approach and the adjusted Kernel approach. Panel A reports results for the full sample,
and Panel B reports results for the disclosure subsample. In addition, Panel C documents OLS regression results for the equation Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPer f ormanceit + δ2 ·
S ystFirmPer f ormanceit + δ3 ·Cit + it on the subsample of RPE-disclosing banks (strong-form RPE tests). We regress logarithm of CEO compensation on unsystematic firm performance,
systematic firm performance, and control variables for 156 firm-year observations over the time span 2004-2013. For more details on the systematic and unsystematic variable construction
see Section 2.3. We report three versions of the Kernel based approach: 1) based on the pdf of the Standard Normal Distribution (Knor), 2) based the pdf of the Uniform Distribution (Kuni),
and 3) based the pdf of the ”Cosine Distribution” (Kcos). The columns denoted with scaled refer to the variants where we multiply the standardized differences with a scaling factor, as
described in . Significance levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient
estimate.
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Table A2: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Panel A: Weak-Form RPE Tests Panel B: Weak-Form RPE Tests Panel C: Strong-Form RPE Tests
– Full Sample – Disclosure Subsample – Disclosure Subsample
Independent Variables Iterative Peer Group Iterative Peer Group Iterative Peer Group
Intercept 3.07* -3.86 -4.92
(0.09) (0.27) (0.17)
Firm stock return 0.49*** 0.69***
(0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (Iterative) -0.07 -0.60*
(0.68) (0.05)
Systematic Firm Perf -0.26
(0.45)
Unsystematic Firm Perf 0.69***
(0.00)
Firm size (sales) 0.37*** 0.69*** 0.69***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth Options -0.49 0.88 0.88
(0.70) (0.76) (0.76)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 76.32% 64.52% 64.52%
Number of observations 318 156 156
Note: Panel A and B show OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPer fit + α2 · PeerPer fit + α3 · Cit + it. The regression results are based on iterative peer
group method. Panel A shows the results for the full sample, and Panel B reports the results for the disclosure subsample. Panel C documents OLS regression results for the equation
Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPer f ormanceit + δ2 · S ystFirmPer f ormanceit + δ3 · Cit + it on the subsample of disclosing banks. We regress logarithm of CEO compensation on the
unsystematic firm performance, systematic firm performance, and control variables for 156 firm-year observations over the time span 2004-2013. We use iterative peer group specification
in order to construct a systematic performance variable. All regressions include year, industry, and country dummies. For more details on systematic and unsystematic variable construction
see Section 2.3. Significance levels are two-sided and denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient
estimate.
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Table A3: Logit regression of RPE use in executive compensation contracts
unscaled scaled
Independent Variables Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni Iterative
Intercept -25.30 -25.86 -25.18 -25.85 -26.14 -25.76 -24.91
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Compensation 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Firm Perf -0.28 -0.29 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.20 -0.12
(0.74) (0.75) (0.82) (0.80) (0.79) (0.82) (0.89)
Peer return 1.18 0.95 0.86 0.76 0.72 0.63 0.36
(0.53) (0.55) (0.63) (0.62) (0.61) (0.65) (0.77)
Firm size (sales) 2.68*** 2.70*** 2.69*** 2.69*** 2.70*** 2.71*** 2.70***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth options -19.64* -19.28 -19.74* -10.26 -19.09* -19.42 -20.08*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 51.80% 51.80% 51.78% 51.79% 51.79% 51.79% 51.75%
Number of observation 318 318 318 318 318 318 318
Note: The table documents logit regression results for the equation yit = γ0 + γ1 · Compit + γ2 · FirmPer fit + γ3 · PeerPer fit + γ4 · Cit + it. The dependent variable is RPE, an indicator
variable which is equal to 1 if the firm discloses peer group use in the compensation contracts. We regress RPE on firm performance, peer returns, firm size, and growth options for 318
firm-year observations over the time span 2004-2013. We include year, country and industry dummies. We report three versions of the Kernel based approached: 1) based on the pdf of
the Standard Normal Distribution (Knor), 2) based the pdf of the Uniform Distribution (Kuni), and 3) based the pdf of the ”Cosine Distribution” (Kcos). The panel ”scaled” refers to the
variants where we multiply the standardized differences with a scaling factor. The last column reports results based on the iterative peer group specification. We report the Cox and Snell’s
R2. Significance levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗). The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
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Table B1: Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Independent Variables Industry Peer Group Industry/Size Peer Group
Intercept 3.18** 3.22***
(0.05) (0.05)
Firm stock return 0.47*** 0.56***
(0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (Industry) -0.06
(0.87)
Peer return (Industry/Size) -0.31*
(0.06)
Firm size (sales) 0.37*** 0.37***
(0.00) (0.00)
Growth options -0.59 -0.61
(0.60) (0.60)
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Country dummies yes yes
Adjusted R2 78.48% 78.67%
Number of observations 318 318
Number of clusters 5 5
Note: The table shows OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 +α1 ·FirmPer fit +α2 ·PeerPer fit +α3 ·Cit +it. The
first column presents the results from regressing log of total CEO compensation on stock return, industry peer performance,
and other variables. The second column documents regression results based on industry and size quartiles, that is, Albuquerque
(2009)’s approach. OLS estimation is based on clustered standard errors. Firm size and growth options for the period 2004
to 2013 are also reported. We include year, industry, and country dummies. The corresponding p-values are reported in
parentheses below each coefficient estimate. We report significance levels for 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗).
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Table C1: List of international banks in the sample
Name of the Bank Country
SWEDBANK Sweden
CREDIT AGRICOLE France
CHINA MINSHENG BANKING China
BANCO DE SABADELL Spain
HUAXIA BANK China
DNB Norway
BNP PARIBAS France
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA Australia
CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK China
BANK OF CHINA China
CIMB GROUP HOLDINGS Malaysia
HSBC HOLDINGS UK
NORDEA BANK Sweden
BANCO SANTANDER Spain
SEB Sweden
SOCIETE GENERALE France
MALAYAN BANKING Malaysia
PUBLIC BANK Malaysia
FIRSTRAND South Africa
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP UK
BARCLAY UK
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP UK
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK Australia
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK COMMERCE Canada
COMMERZBANK Germany
BANK OF MONTREAL Canada
BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA Canada
DEUTSCHE BANK Germany
WESTPAC BANKING Australia
TORONTO-DOMINION BANK Canada
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA Canada
OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING Singapore
BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL Spain
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK Singapore
DBS GROUP HOLDINGS Singapore
UBS Switzerland
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP N Switzerland
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP Australia
STANDARD BANK GROUP South Africa
BANK OF EAST ASIA Hong Kong
NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA Canada
SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN Sweden
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